To be clear, my article was not an attempt to explain all the reasons why China grew so rapidly. It was trying to explain how they created results-based competition with very different mechanisms than other nations.
I have written other more general articles on China here:
Many thanks to Stephen for including my essay, Industrialization Before Liberal Democracy, Part I: Asia, in this excellent reading note.
It places my argument about the sequencing of Asian industrialisation and democratisation alongside IMF research on industrial policy, recent studies of Korea and China, and the wider debate over the middle-income trap. I am grateful for the thoughtful engagement.
Katz's PPP point stood out like if trap = ppl misreading $ vs real buying power, then most 'stuck' economies aren't stuck, they r actually just slower, n tbh this hanges the whole story
Thanks to the link to my article!
To be clear, my article was not an attempt to explain all the reasons why China grew so rapidly. It was trying to explain how they created results-based competition with very different mechanisms than other nations.
I have written other more general articles on China here:
https://frompovertytoprogress.substack.com/p/understanding-the-chinese-economic
https://frompovertytoprogress.substack.com/p/can-chinese-industrialization-strategy
https://frompovertytoprogress.substack.com/p/could-the-chinese-empire-have-industrialized
Many thanks to Stephen for including my essay, Industrialization Before Liberal Democracy, Part I: Asia, in this excellent reading note.
It places my argument about the sequencing of Asian industrialisation and democratisation alongside IMF research on industrial policy, recent studies of Korea and China, and the wider debate over the middle-income trap. I am grateful for the thoughtful engagement.
Katz's PPP point stood out like if trap = ppl misreading $ vs real buying power, then most 'stuck' economies aren't stuck, they r actually just slower, n tbh this hanges the whole story